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ARTICLE
THE PROFESSOR AS MANAGER IN
THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE
STEPHEN R. RIPPs*
I. INTRODUCTION
N ENACTING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,' Congress was in-
tent upon resolving labor disputes in the industrial sector of the
economy through employee organization and collective bargaining.! The
structure and design of this statute, however, creates problems for enti-
ties which do not conform to an industrial model of organization and
operation, but still fall within the jurisdictional ambit of the NLRA.
Although the legislative history of the NLRA indicates that Congress
never seriously considered how the Act would be applied to institutions
of higher education or their faculties,' in 1970 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) assumed jurisdiction over private colleges and uni-
versities.' As a result of this assumption of jurisdiction, subsequent ap-
plication of the Act to these institutions has threatened to undermine
the very foundations upon which colleges and universities rest, and
raises serious questions about whether the NLRA should be applied by
*Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.S., Michigan State
Univ.; J.D., Seton Hall Univ.; M.Ed., Ph.D., Univ. of Toledo. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Charles M. Poplstein, University of
Toledo College of Law.
The National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as NLRA] is ac-
tually the product of three congressional acts promulgated over a 24 year period.
See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) and Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976)).
' See National Labor Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (Steelworkers Trilogy).
' See Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63, 84-85 (1973). See also NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 n.9 (1980) and committee reports cited therein.
Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970). This discussion is
limited to faculties at private post-secondary institutions. The National Labor
Relations Act does not regulate public sector collective bargaining. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976). Public sector collective bargaining, which includes colleges and
universities, is usually regulated by state-collective bargaining statutes.
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the Board to institutions which do not conform, either in terms of gover-
nance or management-employee relations, to "'the traditional authority
structures with which [the] Act was designed to cope. -.
This article will examine the problems which arise when the NLRA is
applied to institutions of higher education, and how the decisions by the
NLRB have not been appropriately sensitive to these problems-par-
ticularly in the area of faculty organization. By focusing upon the issue
of the faculty's right to organize and collectively bargain with the insti-
tution under the NLRA, the difficulties in the application of the Act to
these institutions, without modification, becomes apparent. Insight is
also provided through an examination of the role the faculty plays in an
institution's governance system under traditional theories of higher
education administration, and comparing this with the management sys-
tem in an industrial corporation. In this regard, Board decisions that
declare that faculties at various schools were neither "managerial em-
ployees' nor "supervisors 1 7 under the Act, and therefore able to
organize and collectively bargain with the institution, demonstrates how
the Board's approach does not square with traditional theories of uni-
versity governance.!
This article will also discuss the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University9 which held that faculty members at the university
were "managerial employees" and thereby excluded from coverage
under the Act. This discussion will show that the Board's approach to
this problem has been irrational and further demonstrates why the
NLRB should never have assumed jurisdiction over institutions of
higher education.
II. GOVERNANCE AND DECISION-MAKING IN INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION
All institutions of higher education have basically the same system of
governance.0 In fact, these institutions have structures similar to those
' NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980) (quoting Adelphi Univ., 195
N.L.R.B. 639, 648, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545, 1556 (1972)).
' See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) ("managerial em-
ployees" defined and excluded from the scope of NLRA).
7 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (1976) ("supervisor" defined).
8 See notes 29-62 infra and accompanying text.
444 U.S. 672 (1980).
'0 See J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 409 (3d
ed. 1976). Public and private colleges also have the same characteristic form of
governance. See also R. Healy & V. Peterson, Trustees and College Failure: A
Study of the Role of the Board in Four Small College Failures 52 (October, 1976)
(unpublished study in the Center for the Study of Higher Education, The Univer-
sity of Toledo, Ohio). This study of small, liberal arts colleges revealed that the
colleges that were "dying" lacked concern or involvement in daily operations by
the Board of Trustees.
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of private corporations in the industrial sector. The system is organized
like a pyramid, with the Board of Trustees sitting at the apex. The
Board is entrusted with the legal authority to operate the institution,
and has the final say over all institutional decisions including policy-
making, financial planning and review, budgetary matters and control
over faculty appointments. As is common in industrial corporations, the
Board usually delegates the day-to-day operation of the school to their
chief administrator, the president. The president in turn delegates his
authority to a staff of academic vice-presidents, deans, department
chairmen and other administrators. Within each department or college,
the faculty members sit on committees which make recommendations to
the administration on matters of academic policy, research, hiring, pro-
motion and tenure. In addition, the faculty exercises authority in the
school's governance system through the faculty senate and university-
wide committees which also made recommendations to the administra-
tion regarding institutional decisions."
Again, this organizational structure resembles that of most private in-
dustrial corporation: both are organized in a -pyramid-like structure
with the president managing the day-to-day operations, and a board of
directors or trustees entrusted with the ultimate responsibility over in-
stitutional decisions. 2 Despite this structural resemblance with indus-
trial corporations, institutions of higher education are in fact operated
in a totally different manner. A corporation in the industrial sector is
governed through a bureaucratic chain of command system in which
decisions are made at or near the top of the pyramid and implemented
by subordinates. A university, on the other hand, functions under a col-
legial model of governance or "shared authority."'3 The faculty and the
administration jointly govern the institution. This system enables the
faculty to play a more meaningful and important role in the institution's
decision-making process.
The concept of "shared authority," is based upon the presumption
that both administrators and professors are officers of the college or
" J. CORSON, THE GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 242-43 n.7
(1960). Faculty autonomy and academic control rests within each academic
department. Id See also J. BALDRIDGE, D. CURTIS, G. ECKER & G. RILEY, POLICY
MAKING AND EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP (1978); J. MILLETT, DECISION-MAKING AND
ADMINISTRATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1968). These authors contend that the
most powerful governing body in which the faculty participates is the academic
department's standing committees. Examples of standing committees would be
admissions, curriculum, faculty affairs (which can include salary determinations),
budget, academic policy and personnel. For a description of the typical faculty
senate, see P. DRESSEL & W. FAIRCY, RETURN TO RESPONSIBILITY 127 (1972).
" See Kahn, supra note 3, at 66-67 n.5.
'" See THE UNIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZATION 58 (J. Perkins ed. 1973) and Baratz, Shared
Authority and Collective Bargaining, 12 ACADEMIC: THE BULLETIN OF A.A.U.P. 1 (1977).
A.A.U.P. 1 (1977).
1980]
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university and thus they must jointly decide all matters of concern."
"Shared authority," a product of the medieval university where the pro-
fessors in fact govern the institution, embodies a theory that "the uni-
versity is above all else a collection of specialized scholars. Their
scholarship gives them a primacy in the determination on educational
policy on such subjects as who shall be educated in what knowledge for
which utility."'5 Through this system of joint, shared control, the faculty
in effect governs the institution along with the administration through a
political process in which conflicts between the two groups are resolved
in the committees by debate and compromise."6
Since the university must rely on the faculty to implement the institu-
tion's goals and perform its educational functions, the decisions and
recommendations of the faculty carry considerable weight. The power
that is vested in the faculty is exercised through the various commit-
tees, departments and a faculty senate which have jurisdiction over the
major areas of concern at the institution. Consequently, the faculty ac-
tually plays a managerial role in the governance of the institution. The
power, authority and influence the faculty exerts on policy in the cen-
tral decision-making process of the academic enterprise has been
acknowledged by many noted experts in education administration. The
faculty not only has primary jurisdiction over academic questions, but it
also rules on the hiring, promotion and tenure of its peers. 8 Within the
constraints of available funds, the faculty typically determines what re-
search will be undertaken and what public service projects will be initi-
ated. Their power also extends to establishing admissions standards,
course offerings, tuition rates, and participation in the selection of
14 Id.
" Meeth, Administration and Leadership, in POWER AND AUTHORITY 40 (H.
Hodgkinson & L. Meeth eds. 1971). Meeth describes the collegial method of
governance as a system that is unique to American higher education. The part-
nership between the faculty and the administration, he notes, has produced great
strength and diversity in colleges and universities.
1" See J. BALDRIDGE, POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY (1971). For dis-
cussions of the collegial model and other forms of governance, see J. BALDRIDGE,
D. CURTIS, G. ECKER, & G. RILEY, supra note 11, at 31-41; P. DRESSEL & W.
FAIRCY, supra note 11, at 119-20; J. MILLETT, NEW STRUCTURES OF CAMPUS
POWER 12-19 (1978); McConnell, Faculty Governance, in POWER AND AUTHORITY
99 (H. Hodgkinson & L. Meeth eds. 1971). See also Brousseau, Collective Bargain-
ing and Private University Governance: A Look From the Law Schools, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 625, 627 (1977).
'" See, e.g., ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE (J. Baldridge ed. 1971); J. BALDRIDGE, D.
CURTIS, G. ECKER,. & G. RILEY, supra note 11; J. CORSON, supra note 11; P.
DRESSEL & W. FAIRCY, supra note 11; J. MILLETT, supra note 11; POWER AND
AUTHORITY (H. Hodgkinson & L. Meeth eds. 1971).
"6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686-90 (1979). Faculty mem-
bers tend to see themselves as educational experts (professionals), and therefore,
the only ones qualified to evaluate their peers.
[Vol. 29:17
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academic administrators.19 Although the faculty's committee recommen-
dations are subject to veto by upper-level administrators, including the
board of trustees, their decisions are in practice rarely vetoed. In sum,
the faculty plays a far greater role in the governance system of a uni-
versity than do the employees in a private industrial corporation.
The faculty's influence and control in institutional decisions is in part
attributable to the fact that they share common goals and interests with
administrators. Many of the faculty's immediate supervisors, such as
department chairmen or academic deans, are active or former pro-
fessors. Department chairmen, for example, are usually full-time pro-
fessors who continue to teach while performing the chairman's adminis-
trative duties." Often the chairmanship is alternated among several
professors in the department for designated periods of time due to the
fact that most professors prefer to teach, write or research rather than
perform administrative duties. In addition, many upper-level adminis-
trators, including deans and presidents, are former professors. Conse-
quently, the two groups which share authority in the university's
governance system also typically share certain attitudes, ideas and
goals.
As the preceding discussion reveals, institutions of higher education
are operated in a totally different manner from private industrial cor-
porations. Decisions are not made at the top of the pyramid and imple-
mented through various managers, but rather the opposite situation
exists. The effective control by the faculty over major decisions in post-
secondary educational institutions creates a governance system resem-
bling an inverse pyramid. The faculty decisions, subject rarely to vetoes
by the board of trustees or administrators, become the policies of the
institution. Kenneth Kahn aptly describes the difference between non-
profit colleges and universities and corporations operated for profit:
Behind the superficial structural similarity between a profit-
making and a non-profit corporation, however, is a significant
structural difference. . .. [I]n the private sector the entire
organization works as a team to produce a product which in turn
returns a profit on the investment. Responsibility for product
quality and production is vested in the president and executives
'o See J. CORSON, supra note 11, at 239-42. In essence, the faculty is responsi-
ble for the academic policy and academic personnel in the institution as well as
other areas of concern. Authorities on education administration generally agree
on this governance structure of post-secondary institutions. See ACADEMIC
GOVERNANCE, supra note 17; J. CORSON, supra note 11; P. DRESSEL & W. FAIRCY,
supra note 11; J. MILLETT, supra note 11; and POWER AND AUTHORITY, supra note
17.
, Academic deans are also often former professors who teach courses in addi-
tion to their regular duties. In some schools, deans often return to full-time teach-
ing after a period of service. See Kahan, supra note 3, at 68-69.
1980]
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of the corporation, not in the production employees. In the col-
lege or university, the line of authority is quite different. Con-
trol over the "product" (education) is centered in the production
employees (faculty). The role of the administration is not to con-
trol the final product but rather to serve as a custodian of the
material resources necessary to perform the primary educa-
tional tasks of the institution. The fundamentally different roles
of the private sector management and the college or university
administrator are reflected in the actual decision-making struc-
ture of the institution. When decisions are made which affect
the primary purpose of the institution, the faculty prevails."
In essence, the faculty members are not merely employees of the uni-
versity or college, "they are the college."22
III. SHARED AUTHORITY IN PRACTICE
The shared authority model of government prevalent at colleges and
universities as described above is affected by factors that vary accord-
ing to the type of institution involved. Managing a college or university
is a complex task. The varied nature of educational goals and tech-
niques, power and authority conflicts among personnel, and financial
constraints make these institutions particularly difficult to govern.
Moreover, the autonomy traditionally associated with institutions of
higher education has steadily eroded during the last decade due in part
to a decline in enrollments, financial problem and judicial intervention.'
Decisions by trustees, administrators and faculties which determine the
character of the educational institution are no longer free from outside
control, such as intervention by a centralized state board of regents.'
In addition, the degree of faculty power under the shared authority
concept varies with the type of university involved. The faculty gen-
erally exercises greater managerial (or as educators prefer, adminis-
trative) influence at four-year colleges and universities than at two-year
colleges or community colleges. Similarly, faculty at institutions grant-
ing doctoral degrees (where professors are judged more on the basis of
their research and publication qualities than their teaching perform-
ance) maintain a high-degree of shared authority in the university's
21 Id. at 66-67 n.5.
Id. at 70 n.16 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 672 (1980), also took note of this comment. Id. at 680
n.10.
2 J. CORSON, supra note 11, at 52. For the specifics of this erosion of academic
decisions, program decisions, research decisions, financial decisions and judicial
intervention, see id. at 52-56.
Id. at 52.
Dougherty, Collegiality, Governance, and Collective Bargaining in the
Multi-Campus State University of New York, 28 LAB. L.J. 645 (1977).
[Vol. 29:17
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governance system. Thus, the concept of shared authority may be a
total myth at community colleges where the faculty carries heavy
course loads, where there is less time or demand for research and
where the school may lack a national academic reputation.26
The lack of faculty participation or control leads to diminished power
under the system of shared authority and results in administrative
dominance. Consequently, under these conditions, the faculty may be
forced to seek unionization and collective bargaining as a means of influ-
encing their working environment.27 This trend has already been docu-
mented in two-year community colleges and state universities where
faculty governance has been least assertive.28
IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
THE NLRB's APPROACH
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) seeks to resolve disputes
between labor and management through organization and collective
bargaining.29 The Act was initially designed to deal with the problems in
the manufacturing sector of the economy-an area where there was a
clear distinction between labor and management. 0 An examination of
the legislative history of the NLRA reveals that Congress never con-
sidered applying it to college or university faculty." In fact, Congress
specifically used the college professor to illustrate the type of relationship
Id. at 647.
See Baratz, supra note 13; Obewahn & Spritzer, University Administra-
tor's Attitudes Toward Collective Bargaining: A Comparative Analysis, 27 LAB.
L.J. 763, 772 (1976). See also Krishnan & Krishnan, An Appraisal of Faculty Sen-
timents on Collective Bargaining Institution, 8 ARK. Bus. & ECON. REV. 56 (1977);
McHugh, Faculty Unionism and Tenure, 1 J. COLL. & U.L. 46 (1973); Pottitt &
Thompson, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: A Survey Five Years After
Cornell, 1 IND. REL. L.J. 191 (1976).
J. BALDRIDGE, D. CURTIS, G. ECKER, & G. RILEY, supra note 11, at 14, 154.
See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
'0 The purpose of the NLRA is to encourage the practice and procedure of col-
lective bargaining and protect workers in order to allow the negotiating of terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. National
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Act does not expressly
include faculty members at postsecondary institutions, but does provide coverage
to "professional employees" under section 2(12) and excludes a "supervisor"
under section 2(11).
"' See Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608 (1974);
Kahn, supra note 3, at 79-83, Sherman & Black, The Labor Board and the Private
Non-profit Employer: A Critical Examination of the Worthy Cause Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1331-37 (1970). Kahn argues that if the NLRB wants to in-
clude non-profit institutions of higher education within its jurisdiction, it should
be done by rule-making rather than adjudication. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 102,
and authorities cited therein.
19801
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between employer and employee which the Act was not intended to
cover. 
2
For many years, the NLRB avoided the problems of applying the Act
to colleges or universities by refusing to assert jurisdiction over these
institutions. In Columbia University,33 the Board recognized that, while
the university had a significant effect upon commerce and was thus
clearly within the requisite statutory and Board established jurisdic-
tional requirements, it did not believe that the policies of the NLRA
would be effectuated by asserting its jurisdiction over private colleges
or universities. In adopting this discretionary test, the Board examined
the legislative history of section 2(2) of the Act, which exempted non-
profit hospitals from its coverage.' The Senate version of section 2(2)
excluded only charitable hospitals from the Act's coverage while the
House version additionally excluded non-profit educational
institutions. 5 In opting for the Senate version, the conference report
stated that non-profit educational institutions were "not specifically ex-
cluded in the conference agreement."36 Congress had apparently felt
that only under "exceptional circumstances and in connection with [the]
purely commercial activities of such organizations . . ." would the activi-
ties of educational institutions "affect commerce" and therefore bring
them within the coverage of the NLRA.3 7
In 1970, almost 20 years later, the Board reversed its decision in Col-
umbia University and asserted jurisdiction over private colleges and
universities in Cornell University.' Noting that universities had under-
gone considerable change since 1951, the NLRB held that it was some-
times appropriate to assert jurisdiction over private institutions of
higher education because of the "overwhelming impact and effect" of a
university's activities on interstate commerce.3 9 The impact on com-
32 This occurred during the initial discussions about the Act in 1935, prior to
the 1947 amendments. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935). Only slight
consideration was given to whether colleges or universities were employers
under the Act. No mention was made regarding whether their faculty members
were employees having the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining.
Id.
97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2),
61 Stat. 137 (1947). This exemption was later deleted and presently, health care
institutions are covered under the Act. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360,
88 Stat. 395 (1974).
Compare S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 3753 (1947) with H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 3400 (1947).
N H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 at 505 (1948).
Id. at 536.
183 N.L.R.B. 328, 332, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1273 (1970).
Id. See also NLRB v. Wentworth Univ., 515 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1975). In
Wentworth, the First Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the NLRA and
[Vol. 29:17
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merce was evidenced by the commercial nature of some of the univer-
sity's enterprises, e.g., the book store, cafeteria and its various invest-
ments. Further, the Board noted an increased "federal interest" in the
activities of higher educational institutions evidenced by federal grants
and the previous application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to these
institutions."0 Thus, the NLRB concluded, the facts revealed that col-
leges and universities do engage in activities which substantially affect
commerce."' Therefore, in the interest of achieving orderly resolution of
labor disputes, the Board chose to assert jurisdiction over these institu-
tions, but left the jurisdictional dollar-volume requirements to be devel-
oped through legislative rule making. 2 While recognizing that they
were not accustomed to dealing with these types of institutions, the
Board still decided to apply the tests developed in the industrial sector
for determining what constituted an appropriate bargaining unit for
employees of a multi-facilitied organization rather than simply adapting
those principles to the unique situation existing at an institution of
higher education."3
The NLRB first considered the issue of faculty unit determinations
under the NLRA in C. W. Post Center." Since the faculty members
were clearly "professional employees" as defined by the Act,45 the only
real issue was whether they were excluded from its coverage because
the functions they performed made them either "supervisors" or
"managerial employees." A "supervisor" is defined in section 2(11) of the
Act as a person having power over matters associated with manage-
ment, such as hiring, firing, disciplining or adjusting grievances. In ad-
concluded that, while there was no specific authority in the legislative history for
the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over higher education, it was nevertheless ap-
propriate for the NLRB to do so.
,0 Fair Labor Standards Act, § 3(r)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 201(r)(1) (1976).
41 Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1275 (1970).
42 See 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979). The rule states:
Colleges and Universities: The Board will assert its jurisdiction in any
proceeding arising under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act involving any
private nonprofit college or university which has a gross annual revenue
from all sources (excluding only contributions which, because of limita-
tion by the grantor, are not available for use for operating expenses) of
not less than $1 million.
43 183 N.L.R.B. at 336, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1276.
4 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
" A professional employee is defined as any employee engaged in work of a
predominantly intellectual character, or who has completed a course of specialized
intellectual instruction or training. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). Professional
employees are covered by the Act and may organize and select a collective
bargaining representative. Absent a majority vote of the professionals, however,
they cannot be combined in the same bargaining unit as non-professional em-
ployees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1976).
19801
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dition, a supervisor is one who exercises that power in his employer's
interest and in a manner that "requires the use of independent judg-
ment."'" An employee can be a supervisor whether he has actual author-
ity to exercise any of the powers enumerated in the statutory provision,
or where he can "effectively recommend" such action. Supervisors can
organize their own unions and collectively bargain with their employer,
but they are not covered or protected by the NLRA." This statutory ex-
clusion is based upon the rationale that supervisors are an arm of
management and thus cannot act in the employer's interests if they are
also members of the same union as the employees they supervise.
"Managerial employees," on the other hand, are not excluded from
coverage by the statute itself. Instead, this exemption is a product of a
series of Board and judicial decisions reasoning that these employees
are so much higher in the corporate structure than even supervisors
that Congress "regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no
specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary."48 These em-
ployees "formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing
and making operative the decisions of their employer."' 9 Since these
employees are in effect part of the management team, the dangers pre-
sented by divided loyalty between union and employer necessitate
their exclusion from bargaining unit status.50
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the in-
terest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or re-
sponsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exer-
cise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but re-
quires the use of independent judgment.
Id. Under § 14(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29
U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976), the Board cannot "compel" an employer to include super-
visors in a collective bargaining unit with employees who are not supervisors,
nor can the Board order the establishment of separate "supervisor" unions.
Supervisors, however, are not prohibited from organizing a separate union or
joining a union composed of non-supervisors if the employer permits it. The
Board cannot compel an employer to adopt such a policy. Due to their status,
"supervisors" are generally not covered by the protection of the Act. See R. GOR-
MAN, BASIC TEXT OF LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
34-35 (1976). This result occurs because the protective provisions of the statute,
such as § 7 of the Act which grants rights to employees, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)
and § 8 of the Act which deals with unfair labor practices, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976),
are keyed into the term "employee" as defined in § 2(3). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
"7 See note 46 supra.
8 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,682 (1980) NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267,283 (1974)).
, Id (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947)).
50 See R. GORMAN, supra note 46, at 37-39; W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J.
ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A
[Vol. 29:17
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss1/18
PROFESSOR AS MANAGER
The Board applied these definitions to an academic environment in C.
W. Post Center.1 The faculty at C. W. Post University had exercised
considerable power over academic policy, admissions, hiring, firing, pro-
motion and tenure of professors, subject only to a rare veto by the
chancellor or the Board of Trustees. While admitting that they were
"entering into an uncharted area,''52 the Board found that the faculty
members were neither supervisors nor managerial employees. The fact
that the faculty exercised their authority as a group was not sufficient
to exclude them from coverage.' The Board gave no further explanation
for its decision and held that the C. W. Post faculty were professional
employees and thus entitled to the rights and benefits of collective bar-
gaining."'
The Board reiterated this "collective action test" in Fordham Univer-
sity." Applying the test developed in C. W. Post, the NLRB rejected the
university's contention that the faculty members were supervisors on
the basis of their collegial authority, despite the fact that they had the
power to "effectively recommend" decisions."
In Adelphi University,7 the Board added two more elements beyond
collectivity in regard to the collegiality standard. Rather than operating
under a typical shared authority governance system, Adelphi Univer-
sity maintained a refined system in which a personnel committee com-
prised of eleven professors and a grievance committee of three tenured
professors, all elected by the faculty, determined matters relating to the
employment of fellow faculty members. The Board held that these fac-
ulty members were not "supervisors" under the Act because they exer-
cised their authority collectively. 5 They made decisions in their own
interests rather than the university's and were therefore not acting as
representatives of management. Moreover, the ultimate authority to ap-
prove or veto committee recommendations rested with the Board of
Trustees. The committees' recommendations, according to the Board,
were merely treated by management as advisory. While admitting that
FREE SOCIETY 215, 216 (1979). See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974) (employees coming within the definition of a "managerial employee" are
not covered by the Act and thus not entitled to its rights or protections).
189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
5I d at 905, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
Id. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1003.
5 C. W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1003 (1971). See
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 689, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672
(1980), for the Second Circuit's theory about the Board's "collective authority"
test. Section 2(11) of the NLRA only refers to "individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1976).
5 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971).
See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
5 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972).
58 Id. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556.
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the committee members exercised some "quasi-collegial authority," the
Board did not think it sufficient to justify excluding them from the fac-
ulty collective bargaining unit. 9
In reaching its decision, the Board discussed the problems which a
true collegial system of governance posed regarding the application of
the NLRA. The Board noted that "the concept of collegiality . . . does
not square with the traditional authority structures with which this Act
was designed to cope . . ." since the term "supervisor" contemplated an
organizational structure where "authority [was] normally delegated
from the top of the organizational pyramid in bits and pieces to in-
dividual managers and supervisors who in turn direct[ed] the work of
the larger number of employees at the base of the pyramid.""0 Although
the Board admitted that such a true system of collegiality would not
"square" with the definition of "supervisor" or the basic labor law prin-
ciples of organization and representation, it did not deal with these pro-
blems in Adelphi because it felt that a true system of collegiality did not
exist at that university. The Board did note, however, that if it ever en-
countered a true collegial system,
... [the] delegation by the University to such elected groups (the
committees) of a combination of functions, some of which are in
the typical industrial situation, normally more clearly separated
as managerial on the one hand and as representative of em-
ployee interests on the other, could raise questions both as to
the validity and continued viability of such structures under
[the] Act, particularly if an exclusive bargaining agent [was]
designated. 1
The Adelphi decision thus establishes a three-pronged theoretical
basis for future faculty cases. The faculty must act (1) collectively, (2) in
their own interests and (3) with the ultimate authority resting with the
board of trustees. The fulfilling of these elements indicates that the
members are not managers or supervisors.
The application of these principles, however, has not been so clear-
cut. In one case, the NLRB used the "ultimate authority" test to exclude
two professors who were members of a religious order which controlled
the university from the collective bargaining unit. The Board considered
these professors to be "part of the employer," a status which conflicted
with their interests as non-managerial faculty. 2 This case indicates the
59 Id
Id. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1555-56.
01 Id. at 648 n.11, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1556, n.11.
02 Niagara Univ., 227 N.L.R.B. 313, 94 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1976). See also NLRB v.
The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The United States Supreme
Court held that secondary schools operated by a church to teach both religious
and secular subjects are not within the jurisdiction granted by the NLRA, and to
allow such jurisdiction would violate the first amendment. While this issue was
not addressed in Niagara, it may well be developed in future post-secondary
educational institution cases.
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general trend of the Board to employ this test to reject arguments that
college or university professors were not managers or supervisors
under the Act and therefore were entitled to organize into a collective
bargaining unit.
V. NLRB V. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY: THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
ON THE QUESTION OF FACULTY ORGANIZATION UNDER THE ACT
In Yeshiva University,3 the Board continued to address the question
of the supervisory or managerial status of university faculty in the same
manner as the cases previously discussed. Yeshiva University, a private
sectarian institution chartered under the laws of New York, contained
six undergraduate colleges, four graduate schools, a law school and a
medical school. 4 The administration of the university was organized in a
traditional framework; final authority rested with a self-perpetuating
Board of Trustees. Each school or college enjoyed considerable auton-
omy in determining its own curriculum, grading system and academic
standards. Within this structure, the faculty exercised extensive control
over the management of the institution. Deans and vice-presidents for
academic affairs at each school gave considerable deference to faculty
decisions concerning appointment and tenure. The university had a his-
tory of faculty domination not only in academic affairs (admissions, cur-
riculum, grading and personnel decisions), but also in other matters such
as budget (within each school, senior professors determined the budget
in their subject area) and even the site of facilities. As a result, the
faculty influenced both the central policies of the individual units and
the whole of the university.
In 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association filed a represen-
tation petition 5 with the NLRB seeking to hold an election and establish
a collective bargaining unit composed of all full-time faculty at named
schools within the university. Hearings were held before a Board agent
or hearing officer appointed by the Board. On the basis of facts taken at
the hearing, the Board held that the faculty members were professional
employees covered by the Act and not managers or supervisors.16 This
holding was in spite of evidence that faculty academic "initiatives" had
not been vetoed in several years, that 98% of all faculty hiring recom-
mendations were accepted at one school, and statements by various
6 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975) (determination of bargaining
unit); 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 96 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1977) (university administrators guilty
of unfair labor practice for failure to bargain).
" The case did not involve faculty who worked for "theological programs
affiliated with the university," nor those at the medical sciences graduate school,
the medical school, the law school or the Yeshiva High School. NLRB v. Yeshiva
Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 675 n.2 (1980).
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
' 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1975).
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deans and other administrators that emphasized a great degree of fac-
ulty control.17 In reaching its decision, the Board employed the same
reasoning used in earlier cases: the faculty participated in the decision-
making process on a collective rather than an individual basis, the fac-
ulty acted in its own interests rather than that of the university-
employer and final decision-making authority rested with the Board of
Trustees."6
An election to establish a bargaining unit was subsequently held pur-
suant to the Board's direction, in which the Faculty Association won by
a substantial margin. Following the election, Yeshiva University re-
fused to bargain with, or recognize, the Association despite its certifica-
tion as the unit's exclusive bargaining agent. The Board issued com-
plaints against the University on the basis of the Association's charges
under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.0 The Board rejected
Yeshiva's objections to the propriety of the Board's unit determination,
found the University to be in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
Act, and ordered Yeshiva to bargain with the Association."0
When Yeshiva continued to refuse to recognize or bargain with the
Association, the NLRB sought judicial enforcement of its order under
Section 10(e) of the Act in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." The
67 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 676-77 nn.4 & 5.
60 See notes 44-62 supra and accompanying text.
60 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA states "[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
Section 8(a)(1) of the Acts states "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise ... to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 7 addresses the rights of
employees to organize and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
70 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 96 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1977).
' NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672
(1980). The Act makes no express provision for direct judicial review of Board
decisions in the course of representation proceedings. It does provide for review
of a "final order of the Board" in unfair labor practice matters through the Board
petitioning a designated federal court of appeals under § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1976), a petition by the aggrieved party under § 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
160(f) (1976). Board decisions in election cases relating to the determination of the
bargaining unit were held not to be "final orders" directly reviewable by the
courts of appeals. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401
(1940). The Court held that the basis for review was under NLRA section 10, 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1976), prevention of unfair labor practices, in which the Board's deci-
sion was challenged in a representation proceeding under section 9(d):
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 10(c) is
based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the
enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the record of
such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record
required to be filed under section 10(e) or 10(f), and thereupon the decree
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court engaged in an exhaustive examination of the representation hear-
ing record and found that the faculty "in effect, substantially and per-
vasively operat[ed] the enterprise."72
The Second Circuit reviewed the NLRB's ruling and noted that each
school, college and program at Yeshiva had autonomy in academic
policy, as well as in other matters. Judge Mulligan, writing for the cir-
cuit court panel, was not persuaded by the NLRB's reasons for deter-
mining that the full-time Yeshiva faculty were neither supervisors nor
managerial personnel, "[tlhus, without any analysis the Board found that
Yeshiva's full-time faculty were neither supervisors nor managerial per-
sonnel simply by stating that the substantive authority of the faculty
was wielded in their capacity as professionals and by invoking three
doctrines promulgated in earlier Board rulings."7
Judge Mulligan's discussion of prior Board decisions pointed to the in-
consistent NLRB interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Act regarding
collective decision-making, and stated that the logical and realistic inter-
pretation of that section includes "individuals who exercise supervisory
functions as part of a group or committee . . . since group action is so
frequently encountered in modern corporate decision-making."7" The
court then found that the Yeshiva faculty had power and primary juris-
diction over academic questions, and that faculty decisions in academic
policy matters were not merely advisory, but were definitive: "The
faculty [had] initiated, and the administration [had] repeatedly accepted,
major policy determinations which constitute[d] the essence of the Uni-
versity's educational venture."75 Since the faculty exercised their
authority in conjunction with the trustees and administrators, and not
for themselves alone, they acted in the best interests of the institution.
The court found the argument that faculty decisions were subject to
the ultimate authority of the Board of Trustees to be particularly uncon-
vincing, noting that if this factor alone precluded full-time faculty mem-
bers from being managers, even the university president would be
excluded from managerial status. The court therefore found that the
of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the
order of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testi-
mony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976).
In effect, the employer receives judicial review of a section 9 representation
issue by committing an unfair labor practice and using the representation issues
as a defense to the unfair labor practice charge. When the Board seeks enforce-
ment of its unfair labor practice charges in a court of appeals, the Supreme Court
can review the record of the representation hearing as part of the record of the
unfair labor practice hearing.
7 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 698 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672
(1980).
7 Id. at 696.
' Id at 699.
7 Id. at 701.
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NLRB had failed to use its investigative expertise to make factual
determinations relating to each Yeshiva faculty unit that appeared
before it, and had applied unjustified and arbitrary standards to the
facts." On the basis of these findings, the court refused to enforce the
NLRB's order and instead found that the Yeshiva faculty members were
"managerial employees. 77
A. NLRB v. Yeshiva University: The Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision affirmed the
Second Circuit's opinion."8 The Court, through Justice Powell, exhibited
a marked sensitivity for the differences between industry and institu-
tions of higher education. According to the Court, the danger of divided
loyalty between employer and union which the managerial employee ex-
emption was designed to prevent necessitated applying the exclusion to
the faculty in the present case. The holding was also due in part to the
University's reliance upon decisions made by the faculty on the basis of
their independent professional judgment.
The Court illustrated the danger of divided loyalty between union
and management by citing the case of an employee who had to make
decisions to either formulate or implement his employer's policies." The
Court determined that such an employee could only be considered a
managerial employee since he "exercise[d] discretion within or even in-
dependently of established employer policy and . . . [was] aligned with
management .... ,"o Alignment with management could be found to exist
"only if [the employee] represent[ed] management interests by taking or
recommending discretionary actions that effectively control[led] or im-
plement[ed] employer policy."'"
In light of these considerations, the Court addressed the arguments
presented by the NLRB in support of its position." The fact that the
78 Id. at 703.
77 Id.
78 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
78 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); notes 48-50 supra and
accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 683.
81 Id.
82 The NLRB did not argue that its three theories should be applied only to
private colleges or universities and their faculty. As a result, the Court presumed
that the Board meant to apply these tests to all work environments, a presump-
tion which damaged the Board's position because these rationales conflicted with
their own past precedents. Id. at 687.
"The NLRB also apparently limited their 'lack of ultimate authority' and 'col-
lective authority' rationales to footnotes in their brief to the High Court, and
merely argued that these rationales were not independent tests, but facts which
supported their argument that the faculty act in their own interests, not their
employers." Id. at 685 n.20.
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university administration held a veto power over faculty decisions at
Yeshiva was not relevant according to the Court. This "ultimate author-
ity" theory, applied outside the environment of an institution of higher
education, would seemingly preclude finding managers or supervisors in
any company where the Board of Directors bad ultimate authority over
all decisions made by the corporation. Since the Board did not indicate
that this theory should only apply in the special case of colleges and uni-
versities, the Court found the theory "flatly inconsistent with [the
Board's] own precedents."83 Furthermore, in the present case the ad-
ministration's veto power was "rarely" exercised, hence ultimate
authority was not considered a "relevant" factor. Instead, the focus of
the inquiry was seen to center on whether the faculty exercised "effec-
tive control" over management decisions. 4 As the record indicated, the
evidence clearly established that the Yeshiva faculty did exercise "effec-
tive control" over major institutional decisions. 5
Secondly, the contention that the faculty members were not mana-
gers or supervisors because they exercised their control collectively
rather than individually was held to be without merit. This theory was
in fact "flatly inconsistent" with Board precedents that involved super-
visors who acted "through committees" or involved employees who
owned sufficient stock in a corporation to exert considerable influence
upon company policy. 7 Additionally, neither this theory, nor any other
rationale advanced by the NLRB in its Yeshiva opinion had been "sup-
ported by a single citation to the record."88
Consequently, the only theory propounded by the Board which had
even "colorable validity," according to the Court, was its contention
that the faculty acted in their own independent professional interests
rather than in their employer's interests. The Board argued that the
Yeshiva faculty was not "aligned with management" because of this in-
dependent interest. Since the faculty did not have to "conform to
management policies [or be] judged according to their effectiveness in
carrying out those policies,"" union pressure would not affect their deci-
MI at 685.
Id. at 678 n.8. The Court applied the language from the statutory super-
visor exclusion, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), to the judicially-created managerial ex-
emption since the Court felt that the rationales behind both exemptions were the
same.
85 444 U.S. at 676-79.
Id at 685 n.21 (citing Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972));
Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971); Red and White Airway Cab Co.,
123 N.L.R.B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798-99
(1952)).
87 444 U.S. at 685 n.21. See note 86 supra and cases cited therein.
444 U.S. at 678-79 n.8.
88 Id. at 685 n.22.
Id. at 684.
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sions because the faculty was expected to act in their own and not the
university's interests. This "independent professional judgment test,"
the Board argued, removed any danger of divided loyalty or the neces-
sity of invoking the managerial exclusion.91
The Court refused to accept this argument. Not only had this "profes-
sional expertise-management policy" distinction never been applied to
other professional employees, but it had been "implicitly rejected" on
two previous occasions in other contexts."' The Board's intent to apply
this test to all professional employees would have overruled these prior
decisions, and thus affected the status of countless professionals pres-
ently considered managers or supervisors. Further, requiring a
manager to conform to management policy in order to come within this
exemption was inherently inconsistent with the responsibilities of a
manager: a person who must use his own judgment and discretion
within the confines of the policy set by management."
This "independent professional judgment" test, the Court noted,
would only increase the danger of divided loyalty which the managerial
exclusion seeks to prevent.9 In reality, faculty and administration are
not "distinct separable entities" with inherently contradictory values
and goals. The university strives to maintain a quality institution that
carries out its basic goals within budgetary constraints. Since the real
product offered by any academic institution is education, the university
must rely upon its faculty's "professional expertise" to develop and im-
plement academic policies which produce a quality product within the
broader confines of the institution's goals." On the other hand, the faculty
seeks to fulfill their individual professional goals in a manner that will
increase their stature within their particular field of specialization. In
striving for excellence, therefore, the faculty simultaneously increases
the stature of the university because institutions are judged in large
part by the quality of its faculty.
Consequently, the goals of the university and its faculty members are
"essentially the same."" Not only does the university depend upon the
faculty to carry out its objectives and increase its standing among
higher educational institutions, but the faculty member's professional
standing depends upon the quality of his work and the stature of his
91 Id.
Id. at 687 n.26, citing Sutter Comm. Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B.
181, 193 (1976); Univ. of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220, 221-22, 229 (1973), en-
forced, 506 F.2d 1420 (7th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 678 n.8. According to Justice Powell, the argument of the Board, and
Justice Brennan in his dissent, that the faculty performs its role in the govern-
ance system in their own interest, "assumes a lack of responsibility that is not
reflected in this record." Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 688.
9 Id
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employer. As a result, the Court explained that the faculty's interests
were identical to, and "[could not] be separated from," the university's
goals when they were performing their functions within the school's
governance system. 7 While some conflict over wages and benefits may
exist, this was deemed inherent in any manager-employer relationship.
In fact, noted the Court, the conflict over wages might be less severe in
a higher education environment because a school desires favorable
wages in order to attract a quality faculty and maintain its own stand-
ing.9
8
Under these circumstances, decisions recommended by a faculty are
almost always implemented. According to Justice Powell, "this is an in-
evitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by universi-
ties like Yeshiva."" Since an institution's fate rests in large part upon
the faculty's independent judgment, the danger posed by divided loyalty
is great. Therefore, the Court held that application of the managerial
employee exclusion was necessary in order to prevent these dangers since
the faculty "exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably
would be managerial."'"° In fact, "[w]hen one considers the function of a
university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than
[those made by the Yeshiva faculty].''. On this basis, the Court found
that the Yeshiva full-time faculty members were managerial employees
and affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Court cautioned, however, that this decision would not radically
broaden the managerial employee exemption. An employee cannot be
considered a manager unless his "activities fall outside the scope of the
duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals. ..."'0'
From this starting point, the Court indicated it would consider a variety
of factors besides those present in the Yeshiva case. Faculty members
would not be considered managers, for example, when they were merely
responsible for "the content of their own courses, evaluat[ing] their own
students, and supervis[ing] their own research."'0 3 The Court also sug-
gested that a distinction could be made between tenured and non-ten-
ured professors, depending upon the structure of the school's govern-
ance system.0 4 While this implied that the Court did not wish to apply a
blanket exclusion for college or university faculty at every institution of
higher education, the tenor of the entire opinion implied that the Court
wanted the NLRB to determine this question of a case-by-case basis.
7d 1
Id. at 688 n.27.
Id. at 689 n.28.
Id at 686.
101 Id.
... Id. at 690.
03 Id. at 690 n.31.
104 Id
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This attitude was also reflected in the Court's rejection of the Board's
plea for deference to its initial decision since it came within its areas of
administrative expertise. ' The Court noted that the NLRB had made
no "relevant findings of fact" in the present case."0 6 The "absence of fac-
tual analysis apparently reflects the Board's view that the managerial
status of particular faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory
rationales rather than examination of the facts of each case." Since the
Board's ruling was neither "rationally based on articulated facts," nor
"consistent with the Act," the Court did not defer to the NLRB's judg-
ment."'
105 Id at 684. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 504 (1978).
Id at 691.
107 Id In dissent, Justice Brennan joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
White, argued that the Board's decisions attempting to adapt the Act to the vari-
ous labor environments coming within its jurisdiction should be given deference.
Not only had the Court failed to accord the Board that deference, but it had also
reached the wrong conclusions on the merits. According to Justice Brennan, a
"dual authority" system of governance exists at "mature universities." This
system incorporated a typical hierarchical chain of command structure with a
system designed to incorporate the faculty's "collective expertise as professional
educators" into the decision-making process. Id at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As with any employer, Justice Brennan argued, the administration may accept or
reject their employees' suggestions as they see fit on the basis of budgetary mat-
ters or other policy concerns. Therefore, the administration had the ultimate
authority over all decisions. See id. at 701 n.11 (indicating problems with
repeated employer acquiescence in employee suggestions, especially from
managerial employees and their net effect if applied across the board to all indus-
tries).
Further, Brennan explained that the faculty acts in its own professional inter-
ests. It is not held accountable for its recommendations nor evaluated on the
basis of advice given. Instead, their jobs depend upon teaching ability and
scholarship. Therefore, no danger of divided loyalty exists. "Indeed, the notion
that a faculty member's professional competence could depend upon his undi-
vided loyalty to management is antithetical to the whole concept of academic
freedom." Id at 700. As the faculty vote in favor of unionization indicated, the
professors did not consider themselves "aligned with management." Even if their
interests did coincide with the administration's on most issues, they normally did
not agree on such issues as wages, benefits and terms and conditions of employ-
ment. These disagreements were precisely the kind of disputes with which the
NLRA was designed to deal.
Finally, Brennan contended that the model theory of academic governance,
emphasized by the Court in its opinion as the reason for applying the managerial
exclusion, no longer exists in today's society. Higher education has become a "big
business" run by the administration. Due to financial problems and other factors,
the faculty's power in the decision making process has been considerably eroded.
In fact, faculty members actually organized in order to preserve the status quo
and to protect their waning power, not to gain greater power. Application of the
managerial exclusion removes this potential countervailing power and also
removes any incentive for an administration to deal reasonably with the faculty,
especially since the Act no longer exists as a "deterrent."
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B. NLRB v. Yeshiva University and the NLRA in Higher Education
The Yeshiva University case exemplifies the kind of problems pro-
duced when the NLRA is applied to institutions of higher education
which function on the basis of the "shared authority" doctrine. The
Supreme Court's decision in Yeshiva, although acknowledging the
power of the NLRB to assert its jurisdiction over such institutions,
demonstrates why the NLRA cannot be rationally applied to the field of
higher education. The NLRA simply was not designed to deal with a
system of governance where the faculty and the administration share
authority over what is in effect, a joint enterprise. The administrators,
many of whom are active or former professors themselves, do not deal
with the faculty members as employees, but as colleagues. In this en-
vironment no sharp line divided by adversarial interests exists as it
does in an industrial corporation. Yet, the NLRA is designed to deal
with, and in fact to produce, this exact type of adversarial relationship.
As the Yeshiva case demonstrates, the NLRA is not equipped to deal
with a governance system that is radically different from the bureau-
cratic, hierarchical management system which exists in industrial cor-
porations. The Board itself noted in Yeshiva that "the activities of the
full-time faculty at Yeshiva might suggest managerial or supervisory
status in other contexts, but not in the case of an institution of higher
learning. ' ' ""S While the Board has the right to develop special rules for
specific working environments, the Board's rules in the higher educa-
tion field were almost totally contrary to the decisions handed down in
other contexts -a fact the Supreme Court pointed out on more than one
occasion in its Yeshiva opinion. 9 This inconsistency with past precedent
not only shows the irrationality of the Board's decisions on the faculty
question, but also demonstrates that the Board had to virtually turn the
Act around to make it applicable to the university faculty. Perverting
the NLRA to reach a desired result only proves that the NLRA was not
designed to deal with a shared authority system of governance.
The Supreme Court's decision in Yeshiva represents a step in the
right direction for colleges and universities.' 10 The Court recognized the
fundamental differences between universities and industry, while being
sensitive to their needs and concerns. However, merely leaving future
conflicts to a case-by-case determination by the Board on the basis of
the factual circumstances is not sufficient. The problem is not just
I" NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 697 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S.
672 (1980).
10 See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 682 n.13, 685-86 nn.21-22, 687 n.26.
", The Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision could have far-reaching conse-
quences both in private and public higher educational institutions. The Court's
ruling that the Yeshiva faculty members were managerial employees could
prompt Boards of Trustees in both organized and non-organized institutions to
use the Yeshiva decision to refuse to recognize or bargain with faculty unions.
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whether faculty members are covered by the Act, but rather, the main
concern is what effect application of the Act will have on the institution's
governance system."' Injecting an adversarial system into this environ-
ment could endanger its continued existence. This would pose serious
problems since most authorities consider the shared authority system of
governance "an essential ingredient in a university's striving for excel-
lence.". 2
The NLRA, with its requirement that negotiations between labor and
management be conducted only through the elected collective bargain-
ing agent, would seem to preclude any system of joint faculty-adminis-
tration committees or even a faculty senate."3 Similarly, a system where
the faculty aids in selecting deans, academic vice presidents and
presidents would appear to be inconsistent with this adversarial rela-
tionship of labor and management.
Unionization by faculty has "generally result[ed] in the transforma-
tion of academic policy to employment conditions."" 4 During collective
bargaining, economic matters often take precedence over academic mat-
ters, and faculty control over these academic matters may be bargained
away for greater benefits. The end result, many fear, will be an end to
the system of shared authority brought about by both the loss of faculty
power and prestige through bargaining and the necessity of weakening
or abolishing the committee system and the faculty senate in order to
comply with the NLRA. Application of the NLRA to such institutions
and their faculties, therefore, could either destroy the system of joint
governance or prevent it from ever developing."'
The dangers which could result from faculty collective bargaining are
perhaps best described in the following quote from a former President
of the American Association of University Professors:
". See Kahn, supra note 3 (discussing the problems of applying the NLRA to
colleges or universities).
"' Amicus Curiae Brief of Johns Hopkins University, New York University,
Northeastern University and George Washington University at 11, NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
13 Id. at 8-16. See also Kahn, supra note 3; Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648
n.31, 78 L.R.R.M. at 1556, n.31.
"' Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Society of Professional Engineers at
22-23, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
"' The application of the NLRA to private institutions of higher education
also raises questions concerning the academic freedom of the faculty members in
a union. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Comment,
Union Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Academic Freedom as a Bargaining Chip
in Union Contracts, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 299 (1978); Note, Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968). Although this question
was not discussed by the Court in Yeshiva, it may have had an influence upon the
Court. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Society of Professional
Engineers at 28-32, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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The process of collective bargaining itself, which has been gain-
ing increased ground in higher education, raises problems even
apart from the strike. In dividing the university into worker-
professors and manager-administrators and governing boards, it
imperils the premise of shared authority, encourages the polari-
zation of interests and exaggerates the adversary concerns over
interests held in common. In placing the professor in the posi-
tion of bargainer seeking to exact his demands from the univer-
sity's managers and owners, the process of collective bargaining
heavily burdens the professor's role as primary governor of the
educational enterprise. Moreover, the process itself as it func-
tions tends to remit issues which faculty should themselves
determine to outside agencies such as state and federal boards,
arbitrators, and union bureaucracies. In addition, since unions
rest on continued support of their constituency, the process
becomes susceptible to essentially political rather than essen-
tially academic decision-making. " '
The problem is, however, that no one, including faculty, really knows
what will result from collective bargaining as employed in the univer-
sity setting. Whether the NLRA or a state labor relations law applies,
the danger of collective bargaining by faculty still exists and should be
recognized for what it actually represents: the replacement of a system
of shared authority with an adversarial relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this discussion demonstrates, the true error was for the Board to
assert jurisdiction over colleges and universities in general and over
their faculties in particular. In fact, the very adversarial relationship
between labor and management upon which the NLRB predicates its
jurisdiction is not present in the higher education system of governance
insofar as the faculty is concerned. The Board has not been sensitive to
the different environment which exists in a higher educational institu-
tion, nor has it carefully considered the facts in each case before it has
attempted to apply the Act. NLRB v. Yeshiva University represents
judicial recognition of the Board's inability to understand the role of the
faculty in the operation of the academic enterprise and demonstrates
the inapplicability of the Act in this environment.
In light of the Board's problems in this field and its tendency in past
decisions to adopt conclusory decisions without proper consideration of
the facts, having the NLRB interpret the Supreme Court's Yeshiva deci-
sion in future cases may not be a sufficient solution.
The problems and dangers presented by faculty collective bargaining
to a shared authority governance system militates against any type of
"' Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 AM. A.U.
PROF. BULL. 120, 121 (1972).
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faculty organization. Considering the lack of Congressional considera-
tion of these problems and the dangers posed by application of the
NLRA, the Board should stay its hand, or at least act with appropriate
sensitivity to the problems which its decision to assert jurisdiction over
institutions of higher education has raised. Before faculty collective
bargaining is adopted at any higher educational institution, whether
public or private, all parties concerned should heed the lessons of NLRB
v. Yeshiva University and recognize the fundamental questions it has
raised about the compatibility of faculty unionization and shared
authority.
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